

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Conditionality and consent: A design for measuring public response to IMF programme reviews in Africa

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ABSTRACT

Purpose. The International Monetary Fund's effects on African budgets, health systems and labour markets are well documented, and a smaller literature measures what publics think of the Fund itself, either cross-sectionally or through survey experiments. What no study establishes is whether a real, dated Fund decision moves citizens' evaluations of their own government, because programme participation is endogenous to the economic conditions that also move public opinion, and no survey asks respondents about the Fund. This article identifies a source of variation that removes the selection problem and reports a census of the opportunities it creates.

Methods. Afrobarometer country fieldwork runs for two to seven weeks and the Fund's Executive Board acts on specific dates. Where a Board date falls inside a fieldwork window, respondents interviewed before the decision and respondents interviewed after it differ in exposure to the announcement and in nothing else: same country, same government, same instrument, same sampling frame, same season, separated by days. We match every African arrangement and review Board date between 2019 and 2026 against 26 individually verified Afrobarometer fieldwork windows in Rounds 8 to 10.

Findings. Three Board dates fall inside a fieldwork window, all in Round 9. Sierra Leone's fifth Extended Credit Facility review was completed on 27 June 2022, inside a window running from 13 June to 9 July. Zambia's Extended Credit Facility was approved on 31 August 2022, inside a window running from 3 August to 7 September. Mozambique's first Extended Credit Facility review concluded on 21 November 2022, inside a window running from 30 October to 20 December. A further four windows miss a Board date by four days or fewer.

Implications. The design's value lies ahead rather than behind. Afrobarometer's Round 11 is in the field with a target of 40 countries while roughly nineteen African states hold active Fund arrangements, so the coincidences can be anticipated from the published Board calendar instead of reconstructed from it. We set out the identification strategy, the threats to it and the tests that address each, and specify the analysis in advance.

Keywords: *International Monetary Fund; conditionality; public opinion; Afrobarometer; research design; Africa*

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Introduction

In August 2022 the Zambian government secured what it had been seeking for nearly three years. On 31 August the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund approved a new arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility, releasing finance and unlocking the debt restructuring that Zambia's creditors had made conditional on a Fund programme. Zambian newspapers carried the decision. Radio carried it. It was, by any reasonable standard, national news.

At the time the Board met, Afrobarometer enumerators had been working in Zambia for four weeks and would remain for one more. Roughly nine hundred Zambians had already answered a long battery of questions about their government's handling of the economy, about trust in the president, about whether they had attended a community meeting or contacted a councillor. Some two hundred would answer the same questions in the days after the Board acted. Nobody asked them about the Fund. They were interviewed on different days, using the same instrument and the same sampling frame, and the calendar did the rest.

Three months earlier the same thing had happened in Sierra Leone, and two months later it happened in Mozambique. That coincidence is a research design. This article describes it, reports how often it occurs, and specifies what to do with it.

Fund conditionality and public attitudes

Three literatures bear on this and none of them answers the question. Research on Fund conditionality has become precise about what programmes require and what they do to states. Kentikelenis et al. (2016) coded 65,894 individual mandated reforms from internal lending documents. Stubbs et al. (2017) show that conditionality reduces government health expenditure across sixteen West African countries. Rickard and Caraway (2019) show that demands on public sector wages are met unevenly according to domestic political conditions, and Lang (2021) shows that programmes raise inequality. Ortiz and Béjar (2013) show that programme participation raises contentious collective action in Latin America. The unit of analysis is the state, the ministry, the market or the protest event.

A second literature does measure public attitudes, and it is closer to this article than the first. Breen and Gillanders (2015) use Afrobarometer data to explain how Africans rate the effectiveness of the IMF and the World Bank, and find that political trust and perceived corruption predict those ratings while economic evaluations and demographics largely do not. McDowell et al. (2024) show through survey experiments in Argentina, China, South Africa and Turkey that greater developing-country representation in Fund governance raises public support for participation, working through procedural fairness rather than expected outcomes. Reinsberg et al. (2026) show, in a survey experiment with 1,600 Pakistani respondents, that describing a programme's adjustment costs lowers support while describing continued social protection

raises it, and that confidence in the Fund as an institution is unmoved by either.

Note what all three of those measure. Two are experimental, presenting hypothetical programmes to respondents who are not living through the decision, and the third is cross-sectional and asks about the Fund. None observes what happens to evaluations of the incumbent government when a real Board decision is taken, on the day it is taken, among people who were not asked about the Fund at all. That is the gap, and it is narrower and more defensible than saying African publics have gone unstudied.

A third literature explains why those evaluations are the right dependent variable. Citizens' assessments of government economic management are the mechanism through which economic events reach political consequences (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000), and in African settings those assessments are well measured and behave systematically (Bratton et al., 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007). Easton's (1975) distinction between specific support, which attaches to incumbents and their performance, and diffuse support for the regime itself, tells us which should move and which should not. Whether information of this kind translates into citizen demand is a separate question and the answer is not obvious: Croke et al. (2016) find that better educated citizens in dominant party systems withdraw from politics rather than pressing harder.

The substantive question, then, is whether an externally verified verdict on a government's fiscal conduct changes how citizens evaluate that government. The accountability defence of conditionality implies it should raise evaluations, because a creditor with access to the books supplies information domestic institutions cannot. The austerity reading implies it should lower them, because a Board decision announces both submission to an external creditor and the adjustment that follows, and the evidence that conditionality cuts social spending and raises inequality gives that reading teeth (Stubbs et al., 2017; Lang, 2021; Kentikelenis & Stubbs, 2023).

The question has been hard to answer for a familiar reason. Governments enter Fund programmes when their economies are in trouble, and economic trouble moves public opinion directly; Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) made the selection problem the central methodological fact of this field. Comparing programme countries to non-programme countries, or a country before and after entry, confounds the two. The within-window comparison does not. It also requires no control variables to be credible, because selection into programmes is held fixed by construction rather than modelled.

Two further choices shape what follows. First, the event of interest is a programme review rather than the approval of an arrangement. Approvals are rare, roughly fifty across the continent between 2019 and 2026, and fewer than half fall in countries Afrobarometer surveys. Reviews are frequent, since every Extended Credit Facility and Extended Fund Facility arrangement carries two a year, and they carry information approvals cannot: a review completed on schedule says the government met its conditions, while a review delayed, waived or abandoned says it did not. Programme entry is a switch. Reviews are a scale. Two of the three windows reported below turn on reviews, which makes the distinction operational rather than aspirational.

Second, the design pairs evaluative outcomes with participatory ones. Author (2026) finds that citizens who

believe revenue is handled badly do not act on the belief, because the channels available for acting are clientelist rather than programmatic. If that structure holds, a Board decision will move what people say about the government and leave what they do untouched, and the absence will be the finding.

Data and the construction of the event calendar

Survey data

Afrobarometer Round 8 covers 34 countries and 48,084 respondents, fielded between 2019 and 2021. Round 9 covers 39 countries and 53,444 respondents, with fieldwork running from 31 October 2021 to 17 July 2023. Round 10 was completed during 2024 and 2025 and country files are being released on a rolling basis. Samples are nationally representative, clustered, stratified, multi-stage area probability samples, generally of 1,200 or 2,400 respondents, drawn and weighted according to the network's published sampling and weighting protocols (Afrobarometer, 2022).

The variable that makes the design possible is DATEINTR, the respondent-level date of interview, recorded to the day and present in every round. In the merged Round 9 file its values run from 31 October 2021 to 17 July 2023. Every respondent can therefore be placed on either side of any calendar date.

Variable names were read from the released data dictionaries rather than assumed, and this matters more than it sounds. Round 8 and Round 9 reuse the same question numbers for different items. In Round 8, Q11B is "join others to raise an issue"; in Round 9, Q11B is "contact local government councillor". A variable map carried across rounds does not fail, it analyses the wrong item silently. For Round 9 the government performance battery is Q46A managing the economy, Q46D keeping prices stable and Q46C creating jobs; presidential performance is Q47A; trust in the president and parliament are Q37A and Q37B; participation is Q10A, Q10B, Q10C and Q11B; Q30 records the extent of democracy; the news source battery is Q74A to Q74E. For Round 8, used here only for placebo tests, the corresponding items are Q50A, Q50D, Q50C, Q51A, Q41A, Q41B, Q11A, Q11B, Q11C, Q12A, Q36 and Q55A to Q55E. The Lived Poverty Index runs on Q6A to Q6E in Round 9 and Q7A to Q7E in Round 8.

Released case counts do not always equal design samples. The Mozambique Round 9 release carries 1,120 cases against a design sample of 1,200; the Zambia and Sierra Leone Round 9 releases carry 1,200 each. Window arithmetic below uses released counts.

Event data

Programme and review dates come from two sources. The Fund's Monitoring of Fund Arrangements database covers arrangements approved from 2002 onward, records quantitative and structural conditionality, scheduled purchases and reviews, and compliance at each review, and is updated within weeks of each Board meeting. It supplies both the calendar and the review outcome measures the design needs. For arrangements approved before 2019 the IMF Monitor conditionality dataset offers a finer coding of conditions by policy area (Kentikelenis et al., 2016); it ends in 2019 and so cannot carry an analysis of Rounds 8 to 10, and is used here only to validate condition counts on the overlapping period.

Arrangement approval dates were compiled from the Fund's lending arrangement tables read at six dates between June

2019 and August 2026, which together capture every arrangement active at any of those points. Two classes of event are consequently absent. Arrangements opening and closing entirely between two snapshots could be missed, and Rapid Credit Facility and Rapid Financing Instrument disbursements never appear, because they are outright purchases rather than arrangements. The second omission matters for anyone wanting the 2020 emergency financing as a treatment. Review Board dates were taken from individual Fund press releases, each of which carries a number and a date and states whether a review was completed, completed with waivers, or deferred.

Fieldwork windows

The merged Afrobarometer codebooks contain no table of fieldwork dates by country. Each window therefore had to be read from an individual study record or country report. We verified 26 country-round windows, selecting those where an arrangement or review Board date fell in the same calendar year as fieldwork, which is where a coincidence could exist. The Afrobarometer holds roughly 112 country-round observations across Rounds 8 to 10, so the census below is a lower bound on the population of usable windows, not an exhaustive count.

The census

Confirmed windows

Three Board dates fall inside a verified fieldwork window. All three are in Round 9 and in 2022. Table 1 reports them. Figure 1 places them, and the closest near misses, on a common timeline.

Table 1. Board dates falling inside an Afrobarometer fieldwork window, Rounds 8 to 10.

Indicator	Sierra Leone	Mozambique	Zambia
Round	9	9	9
Fieldwork window	13 Jun – 9 Jul 2022	30 Oct – 20 Dec 2022	3 Aug – 7 Sep 2022
Days in window	27	52	36
N in released file	1,200	1,120	1,200
Board date	27 Jun 2022	21 Nov 2022	31 Aug 2022
Event type	Review	Review	Approval
Press release	22/234	22/403	22/297
Days before / after	14 / 12	22 / 29	28 / 7
Expected N before / after	622 / 533	474 / 625	933 / 233
Threshold position	0.54	0.43	0.80

Note. Events are, for Sierra Leone, completion of the fifth review under the Extended Credit Facility; for Mozambique, conclusion of the first review under the ECF; for Zambia, approval of a new ECF arrangement. N is cases in the released data file, not the design sample. Expected counts apportion the released sample by interviewing days on each side of the threshold; they are arithmetic, not measurement, and realised counts from DATEINTR will differ because interviewing is not evenly paced. Respondents interviewed on the Board date itself are excluded. Threshold position is the fraction of the window elapsed at the Board date. Press Release 22/234 is dated 27 June 2022 and was posted on 28 June; the Board date in the release body should be confirmed, though with a 27-day window and a threshold near the middle the distinction does not affect the design.




Figure 1. Afrobarometer Round 9 fieldwork windows and IMF Executive Board dates, 2022.

Note. Bars are fieldwork windows. Shaded bars are the three windows containing a Board date; open bars are the two closest near misses. Senegal and Niger are shown because their Board dates fall four and three days after fieldwork closed.

Two features of Table 1 matter more than the count. First, the three windows are not interchangeable. Sierra Leone and Mozambique place the threshold near the middle of the window, at 0.54 and 0.43 of elapsed fieldwork, apportioning roughly 533 and 625 treated respondents. Those are splits that support subgroup analysis. Zambia places it at 0.80, five days from the close of a 36-day window, leaving perhaps 233 treated respondents, which will not sustain a heterogeneity test. Zambia corroborates or fails to corroborate; it does not carry an estimate.

Second, event type is no longer perfectly confounded with country. Two of the three events are reviews, in two different countries, against one approval in a third. A design resting on Mozambique alone could not distinguish “reviews behave differently from approvals” from “Mozambique behaves differently from Zambia”. With Sierra Leone it can begin to, weakly, on three observations.

Near misses, and why they are evidence

Four further windows miss a Board date by four days or fewer.

Table 2. Windows missing a Board date by four days or fewer.

Country, round	Fieldwork window	Board date	Miss
Tanzania R10	22 Jun – 24 Jul 2024	20 Jun 2024	2 days before
Senegal R8	12 Dec 2020 – 9 Jan 2021	12 Jan 2021	3 days after
Niger R9	9 Jun – 26 Jun 2022	29 Jun 2022	3 days after
Senegal R9	25 May – 18 Jun 2022	22 Jun 2022	4 days after

Note. Miss is measured from the nearer edge of the fieldwork window: Tanzania’s Board date falls before its window opened, the other three fall after their windows closed. Events are, in order, completion of Tanzania’s third ECF review with approval of an RSF arrangement; completion of Senegal’s second review under the Policy Coordination Instrument; completion of Niger’s first ECF review (PR 22/237); and completion of Senegal’s fifth PCI review together with the second reviews under the Stand-By Arrangement and the Standby Credit Facility (PR 22/221). Kenya’s Round 9 window, 12 to 30 November 2021, misses the second reviews of its EFF and ECF arrangements, completed on 17 December 2021, by seventeen days and is therefore not listed.

The near misses are not consolation. They are the basis for the only projection this article makes. Seven of 26 verified windows, better than one in four, either contain a Board date or come within four days of one. Three contain one. Since roughly half the remaining country-rounds in Rounds 8 to 10 coincide with an active arrangement, completing the calendar should yield something in the region of eight to fifteen usable windows in total. That figure is an expectation from a partial

census and not a result, and it is the single most useful thing a reader can do with this article: finish the count.

There is also a pattern in Table 2 worth naming. Three of the four near misses are Board dates falling just after fieldwork closed, and two of them cluster in late June. The Fund's Board completes a heavy volume of business before the northern summer, and Afrobarometer teams frequently close fieldwork in June. Two calendars with their own rhythms come close and slide past each other. That regularity is what makes the Round 11 strategy worth taking seriously, because the near misses are near for structural reasons and a survey team that knows the Board calendar can convert them.

What the census does not contain

Zero straddles appear in Round 8 or Round 10 among the windows we verified. We do not read this as a property of those rounds. Round 8 fieldwork is unusually strung out, running from 2019 to 2021 rather than across a single year, which makes country windows harder to locate and means we verified few of them; Round 10 releases are still arriving, with fewer than half the countries yet in the World Bank catalogue when this census was compiled. The absence reflects the census, not the world.

Windows in countries with no Fund arrangement during fieldwork cannot contribute by construction. Ten of the African countries holding arrangements between 2019 and 2026 are not surveyed by Afrobarometer at all: Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Somalia. Those arrangements and their reviews are unusable whatever their dates, and this is a permanent ceiling on the design rather than a gap to be filled.

Identification

The comparison

Within a country-round, let the Board date divide respondents into those interviewed before it and those interviewed after. For respondent i in primary sampling unit j we estimate

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta \text{Post}_{ij} + X'_{ij} \gamma + \delta_{rj} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where Post is one for interviews after the Board date and zero before, X holds age, gender, education, urban or rural residence and the Lived Poverty Index, δ are region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered on the primary sampling unit, which is the level at which Afrobarometer samples and therefore the level at which clustering is warranted on the design-based argument of Abadie et al. (2023). Estimation is weighted by the within-country survey weight (Afrobarometer, 2022). Pooling the three windows replaces region fixed effects with country-round by region fixed effects, so identification stays inside windows.

Respondents interviewed on the Board date are dropped. The reason is practical rather than statistical. The Board sits in Washington and decisions are released late in the Washington day, which in West, East and Southern African time zones falls at or after the close of interviewing. A respondent interviewed on the Board date almost certainly had not heard, and coding them as treated would misclassify a day of untreated respondents and bias the estimate toward zero. In Sierra Leone this costs 44 respondents, in Zambia 33, in Mozambique 22.

The threat

Interview date is not random. Afrobarometer fieldwork assigns enumeration areas to teams in a sequence determined by logistics, and remote and rural areas are often visited last. If treated respondents live in systematically different places, a difference in outcomes may reflect geography rather than the event. This is the central problem and it admits four responses, all of which the pre-specified analysis runs.

Covariate balance across the threshold, reported window by window with a joint test, establishes whether the two groups differ on observables. Given how fieldwork is sequenced, our prior is that treated respondents will be somewhat more rural and poorer, which would bias evaluative estimates downward and make a positive estimate a lower bound.

Region fixed effects restrict the comparison to respondents in the same region interviewed on either side of the date. Enumeration area fixed effects would be preferable and are unavailable in practice, because an area is normally visited once.

A previous-round placebo takes the same country, the same relative position within the fieldwork window, and a date on which the Board did not act, and runs the identical specification on the preceding round. For Mozambique that means a pseudo-threshold at 0.43 of the Round 8 window. A significant placebo estimate indicates the design is reading fieldwork sequence rather than the event.

A permutation test reassigns the threshold to every feasible date in the window, subject to at least fifty respondents on each side, and locates the true estimate in the resulting distribution. On three windows this carries more weight than any parametric standard error, because it tests the null that the Board date is not special against the full set of dates that were not the Board date. Young (2019) shows how far conventional standard errors can overstate significance in small samples relative to randomisation tests of exactly this form, which is the reason for reporting it in the main text rather than an appendix.

Pre-specified analysis

The analysis is specified here in full so that estimates, when produced, are not chosen after seeing them. Three windows support some of what follows and not all of it, and we mark which is which.

Balance. Differences in age, gender, education, urban or rural residence and the Lived Poverty Index across the threshold, by window, with a joint F test. Reported first and read before anything else.

Evaluative outcomes. Handling of managing the economy, keeping prices stable and creating jobs; presidential performance; trust in the president and in parliament. Three specifications each: the raw difference, then with covariates, then with covariates and region fixed effects. Movement across the three columns is diagnostic in itself; a large raw difference that collapses once region enters means the design is reading the fieldwork route.

Heterogeneity. The treatment indicator interacted with the Lived Poverty Index and, separately, with the media exposure proxy. The informational account predicts a positive interaction with exposure; the austerity incidence account predicts a negative interaction with deprivation. Feasible in Sierra Leone and Mozambique. Not feasible in Zambia, where roughly 233 treated respondents will not support it, and the

Zambian column should report minimum detectable effects rather than pretend to precision.

Participatory outcomes. Attending a community meeting, joining others to raise an issue, contacting a councillor, and attending a demonstration or protest, on the same three specifications. We expect nulls. A null is a finding only if it is precise, so each coefficient is reported with its confidence interval and with the minimum effect the window could detect at conventional power, following Rainey (2014) on what it takes to argue for a negligible effect rather than merely fail to reject. A wide null is silence.

Diffuse support placebo. The extent of democracy item should not move, because the argument concerns specific support for incumbents rather than diffuse support for the regime (Easton, 1975). Movement there would mean the design is capturing something broader than claimed.

Review outcome asymmetry. Each event coded from the MONA compliance fields as a routine completion, a completion granting waivers for missed performance criteria, or a delayed or interrupted review, interacted with the treatment indicator. With three windows this is descriptive at best. Two reviews and one approval in three countries can show whether the two reviews resemble each other more than either resembles the approval, which is suggestive and is not a test. A test needs the completed calendar.

Robustness. A donut specification dropping respondents within three days either side of the threshold, to allow for lagged diffusion. Restriction to urban respondents, where the informational mechanism should be strongest. A local linear fit on either side of the threshold across three bandwidths, treated as a supporting estimate rather than the headline for the reasons Hausman and Rapson (2018) set out for discontinuities in time, where the running variable is a date and the usual manipulation and density tests do not apply. Sensitivity to the treatment of the Board date, coding those respondents as treated and as untreated as well as dropping them.

Discussion

Three windows in eight years of surveys is a thin harvest, and it would be a poor advertisement for the design if the three were all it could ever offer. They are not, for a reason that has nothing to do with luck.

Until now these coincidences have had to be reconstructed. The Fund publishes its Board calendar in advance, and Afrobarometer publishes its fieldwork schedule in advance, and nobody has had a reason to read them against each other. Round 11 is in the field with a stated target of 40 countries. Roughly nineteen African states held active Fund arrangements as of mid-2026, each generating two Board reviews a year. The expected number of coincidences in a single round, given a one-in-four rate of near misses in our census, is not small, and for the first time it is foreseeable rather than archaeological. A design registered against the published Board calendar before fieldwork opens, with outcomes and specifications fixed in advance, converts an accident into an instrument.

There is a stronger version of the same point. A survey organisation that knew which countries were approaching a Board date could schedule fieldwork to straddle it deliberately. We do not propose that Afrobarometer distort its schedule for one research question, and the ethics of doing so would need thought. The weaker version costs nothing:

publishing fieldwork dates far enough ahead that researchers can identify the coincidences while there is still time to prepare.

Two implications for the substantive question follow from the census rather than from estimates, and we state them as such. The first is that the accountability defence of conditionality has an observable prediction at the level of the citizen, and the tools to test it have been available for a decade without being used. That is a gap in the literature and not a limitation of the data. The second is that the distinction between approvals and reviews is not a refinement but the substance. Approvals are rare, anticipated and confounded with the economic crises that produce them. Reviews are frequent, vary in outcome, and carry information precisely when they go wrong. Future work on public response to Fund programmes in Africa should treat reviews as the unit.

Limitations

The design identifies the effect of an announcement, not of a programme. Conditions take effect over months and their consequences for households arrive later still. What a respondent interviewed three days after a Board meeting can register is news.

Exposure is unmeasured. No Afrobarometer round asks whether the respondent heard a particular announcement. The news source battery supports a proxy, and the informational account predicts larger effects among the more media-exposed, which is testable. A proxy is not exposure. Self-reported news consumption is a poor measure of actual exposure and is systematically over-reported (Prior, 2009), and Conroy-Krutz (2018) shows that the relationship between media exposure and political engagement in African settings is strong enough that mismeasuring it matters. Respondents who heard nothing sit in the treated group and pull estimates toward zero, so estimates are conservative if an effect exists and uninformative if the result is null.

Anticipation attenuates routine events. Board decisions are trailed by staff-level agreements weeks in advance. Zambia's was announced on 3 December 2021, nine months before the Board acted, so the Zambian estimate is a lower bound on the effect of genuinely new information. This is also the analytical reason for preferring reviews: a routine completion is anticipated, a delayed or waived review is not.

Finally, the design will always speak to a subset of African programme experience, and the subset is not random with respect to state capacity, since a country surveyed regularly by a continental research network is not a typical fragile state. Seven of the 26 windows fall within four days of a Board date, which tells us the calendars nearly align often, but ten African countries with Fund arrangements are outside Afrobarometer entirely and several of those hold the most heavily conditioned programmes on the continent.

Conclusion

Survey fieldwork and the Fund's Board calendar occasionally intersect, and where they do they produce a comparison that the selection problem otherwise forecloses. Three such intersections exist in Afrobarometer Rounds 8 to 10, two of them on programme reviews rather than approvals, and four more come within four days. The estimates those windows will support are specified above and are not yet run. The more durable point is that the intersections need no longer be discovered after the fact. Both calendars are published in

advance, and reading them against each other before the next round opens would turn a set of accidents into a design.

Data availability

All survey data are public. Afrobarometer Rounds 8, 9 and 10 country and merged files are available at afrobarometer.org/data, and country-round fieldwork dates were read from study records in the World Bank Microdata Library. Event dates are public: the IMF Monitoring of Fund Arrangements database at imf.org/external/np/pdr/mona, the Fund's lending arrangement tables at imf.org/external/np/fin/tad, and individual Fund press releases cited by number in Tables 1 and 2. The window and event calendar assembled for this article, and the analysis code implementing the pre-specified analysis, are available from the author and will be deposited on acceptance.

Ethical approval

Not required. The study uses only publicly available secondary survey data and public institutional records, and involves no contact with human participants.

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Conflict of interest

The author declares no competing interests.

Author contributions

Conceptualisation, design, data compilation, analysis, drafting, review and editing.

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